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ABSTRACT. Domestic efforts to establish a right to civil counsel by drawing narrow
analogies to Gideon v. Wainwright have met with limited success. In contrast, two principles
drawn from international jurisprudence -the human right to "civic participation" and the
concept of "equality of arms"-resonate with emerging U.S. jurisprudence in both state and
federal courts and suggest new directions for domestic advocacy on the civil right to counsel.
First, the human right to civic participation, incorporating access to justice, underscores the
democratic values at stake when individuals are not able to fully participate in civil judicial
processes because of lack of counsel. Second, the concept of equality of arms hones in on the
source of that democratic distortion- inequality- and sets a baseline for ensuring acceptable
procedural protections. Strengthening considerations of participation and equality within the
constitutional due process calculus would position courts to examine the broader class-based
impacts of the denial of civil counsel in cases such as mortgage foreclosures or insurance
redlining. Rather than conduct a case-by-case review, which slows litigation, creates uncertainty,
and deters litigants from coming forward, U.S. courts viewing the civil right to counsel through
the lenses of civic participation and equality of arms could act more broadly to mitigate the class-
based impacts of procedural inequality in addition to the case-specific impacts. This approach,
grounded in democratic values rather than need, does not ignore the lessons of Gideon, but
draws on its more subtle themes-themes that have sometimes been eclipsed by a focus on
liberty interests.
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INTRODUCTION
The origins of the phrase "today's dissent is tomorrow's majority" are
obscure, but the phrase itself, a reference to the way in which the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence evolves and even reverses itself over time, is ubiquitous.'
Of course, dissenters' predictions do not always turn into majority views.
Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly, which predicted the wholesale
expansion of appointed counsel to civil cases, is a case in point.'
Goldberg famously held that the termination of subsistence welfare benefits
triggers constitutional due process rights.' Yet even while finding that welfare
may be "more like property than like a gratuity,"' the Court placed limits on
the procedures constitutionally mandated when welfare is terminated. In
particular, state-appointed counsel was explicitly not required. Rather, the
Court indicated that the recipient must simply "be allowed to retain an
attorney if he so desires."s
Writing in dissent, Justice Black railed against the majority's extension of
constitutional protection to welfare benefits and the burdens that it would put
on the state. Though he had authored Gideon v. Wainwright only a few years
before, the Justice expressed grave concern about the implications of the
Goldberg majority opinion, warning that
today's decision requires only the opportunity to have the benefit of
counsel at the administrative hearing, but it is difficult to believe that
the same reasoning process would not require the appointment of
counsel, for otherwise the right to counsel is a meaningless one since
these people are too poor to hire their own advocates.'
More than four decades later, Justice Black's cynical Goldberg prediction has
failed to capture a majority of the Supreme Court. Far from expanding the
right to counsel in civil cases, the Court has expressly declined to mandate
appointed counsel in cases involving child custody (Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services') and loss of liberty for a civil violation (Turner v. Rogers8). Cases
1. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Ginsburg's Dissent May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 20,
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/opinion/oe-sunstein2o.
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 260-61 (majority opinion).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 270.
6. Id. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
7. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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after Goldberg considering the procedures constitutionally required when
terminating government benefits, such as Mathews v. Eldridge, do not mention
a right to civil counsel even to disclaim it.9
This Essay, nevertheless, argues that Justice Black was essentially correct.
But rather than arising from the plaintiffs desperate need, as Justice Black
surmised, the seeds of a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases are to be
found in Goldberg's emphasis on the values of democratic citizenship and
community participationo and Gideon's consideration of procedural equality."
While these ideas are not themselves new, as detailed below, two principles
drawn from international jurisprudence - the human right to "civic
participation" and the concept of "equality of arms" -resonate with emerging
U.S. jurisprudence in this area, and suggest new approaches to domestic
advocacy.
First, the concepts of democratic citizenship and community participation
have long been important background values in constitutional jurisprudence.
They play a significant role in, for example, many constitutional cases that
recognize the importance of equipping individuals to participate in our political
system by ensuring equal access to education." However, promotion of
community participation is a value underlying due process protections as
well." In Goldberg, the majority traced these concepts to the original
constitutional compact when, in mandating pre-termination hearings, the
Court stressed that the "general Welfare" and the "Blessings of Liberty" are
promoted and secured when the poor have "the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community."'4
While participation in a community has many facets, one of the most
8. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
9. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (addressing social security disability benefits); see
also Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) (per curiam) (same).
10. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
11. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[S]ome degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we
are to preserve freedom and independence." (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205, 221
(1972))).
13. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (noting that the basic goals of due
process include fostering participation of those affected by decisions); see also Lawrence B.
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 275-281 (2004) (discussing participation as a
value underlying due process norms).
14. 397 U.S. at265.
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important is certainly participation in civic institutions such as the judicial
system."s
International law embraces similar values. Under international law, the
concept of a human right to civic engagement or a right to participation in
public institutions cuts across individual treaties and declarations, attaining
recognition as a core tenet of good governance.16 While descriptions of the
right to civic engagement often reference engagement with elected bodies,
judicial bodies are not excluded from its ambit." In fact, engagement with
judicial bodies is particularly important when the issues before the courts have
significance beyond the individual litigants, as is the case in common law
systems where decisions are enshrined in precedent and projected forward as a
baseline for future decisions.'8 Both the domestic concept of community
participation and the international right to civic engagement make clear that
access to government institutions in order to participate in decisions affecting
oneself or one's community is a universal value necessary for responsible and
sustainable governance.
Second, the concept of equality also crosses domestic and international
lines and is central to access-to-justice jurisprudence in both arenas. Gideon v.
Wainwright rests, in part, on equality grounds, as the decision observes
repeatedly and with concern that inequalities result when the prosecution is
represented while poor defendants are not.' 9 This concern is described more
succinctly in international jurisprudence as the issue of "equality of arms,"
which is the fundamental principle that a party should be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present its case in conditions that do not place it at a substantial
disadvantage vis-i-vis its adversary.20 Considered together, the domestic and
15. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (concluding that Tennessee's failure to
provide disabled individuals with access to judicial services and public programs violated
due process); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (finding that due process requires
states to ensure access to court to obtain a divorce).
16. JOHANNA JOKINEN, U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS ADDRESSING GOOD GOVERNANCE 11-14 (2002) (reviewing international law
on civic engagement).
17. See, e.g., Good Governance and Human Rights, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUM. RTs., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/Good
Governancelndex.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (linking courts to human rights and good
governance principles through their common concern with the rule of law).
18. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role ofPrecedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991).
19. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
20. While "equality of arms" is applied primarily in criminal prosecutions and international
arbitrations, it has also been repeatedly endorsed in civil cases. See, e.g., Airey v. Ireland, 32
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international versions of this concept underscore the extent to which equality is
part and parcel of procedural fairness.
Having defined these concepts, I want to put them to use in exploring a
specific question: can a civil right to counsel in the United States be grounded
in the due process right to an equal opportunity for civic participation?" As set
out below, I argue that an expanded concept of equality of arms, encompassing
broader ideas of societal equality beyond the four walls of the courtroom, may
lead to an affirmative answer.
This Essay proceeds as follows. First, I examine U.S. federal and state court
jurisprudence on the civil right to counsel to ascertain whether arguments
concerning equal opportunity for civic participation have gained purchase.
While some state courts have found a civil right to counsel when participation
in family life is at issue, the value of ensuring more meaningful civic
participation has generally been absent from the discussion. Some courts have,
however, identified equality concerns as a consideration in appointing civil
counsel under both due process and equal protection provisions. Though not
fully developed in domestic jurisprudence, these equality considerations are on
a continuum with the broad rationale laid out in Goldberg.
Second, I look to the international arena to examine the roles that
participation and equality have played in securing international recognition of
the civil right to counsel. While an oft-cited rationale supporting the civil right
to counsel in individual cases is equality of arms, international actors situate
this concept in its larger context. Civic participation and procedural equality
are freestanding rights under international law, often playing a central role in
discussions of procedural protections." Broader social disparities have been
Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1979). At least one U.S. court has rejected the assertion that the
concept is relevant to U.S. criminal law. See United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58, 63
(S.D.N.Y. 20o8) (asserting that equality of arms "has no place in our constitutional
jurisprudence" because a criminal defendant is not constitutionally entitled to match the
state's resources). Scholars, however, argue that the concept has utility in civil contexts. See
James R. Maxeiner, A Right to Legal Aid: The ABA Model Access Act in International
Perspective, 13 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 61, 65-68 (2011); Jay Sterling Silver, Equality ofArms and
the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007.
21. Useful empirical research supporting this could examine issues, such as housing, safety, and
food, that most influence civic participation and evaluate how those influences are
manifested. Post-Occupy analysis concerning the impact of the wealth gap in the United
States may be relevant. See, e.g., Pat Garafolo, Occupy Wall Street One Year Later: Ten
Key Charts About Inequality, THINK PROGREss (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://think
progress.org/economy/2012/o9/17/8567li/ten-inequality-charts-occupy/?mobile=nc.
22. Article 21(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone has
the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
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acknowledged, and the impact of the lack of counsel on racial minorities and
women has been an important marker for international lawmaking bodies."
Finally, I consider what lessons domestic actors might draw from the
international law context. International comparators suggest ways in which
domestic procedural norms might be reconceived to incorporate the value of
civic participation as a basis for expanding the right to counsel. A version of
"equality of arms" has begun to take hold in the United States as a factor when
courts consider claims for appointed counsel. 4 Greater breadth could be given
to that concept by contextualizing it within communities. This approach would
not supplant an evaluation of individual need, but provide an alternative
analysis promoting the values of civic participation and equality articulated by
the majority in Goldberg and hinted at in Gideon.
I. U.S. JURISPRUDENCE: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, EQUALITY, AND
CIVIL COUNSEL
A survey of federal and state cases addressing the civil right to counsel
reveals that individual considerations of participation and procedural equality
are occasionally referenced, and sometimes included in a list of the relevant
factors to be weighed. However, few courts have appreciated the centrality of
participation and equality to the fundamental purposes of due process
protections. Because court decisions have generally failed to identify the
broader community-wide or population-based impacts of the denial of counsel,
no case has adequately defined, synthesized, and integrated issues of civic
participation and procedural equality into its decisional framework concerning
the civil right to counsel.
A. Supreme Court Case Law
1. Due Process Analyses and the Right to Counsel
The concept of civic participation has been a muted presence in the federal
right-to-counsel jurisprudence, which has focused principally on individual
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 1o, 1948). Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that "[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 69-80.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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harms and whether the interest at stake is "fundamental."
To date, the Supreme Court has found a presumption against appointed
counsel in civil cases where physical liberty is not implicated, and has only
sometimes required counsel where physical liberty is at issue. After Gideon v.
Wainwright,2 s the Court extended the mandate of appointed counsel beyond
the criminal context in In re Gault, holding that appointed counsel was
required in juvenile delinquency proceedings because they might "result in
commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed."" A
plurality of the Court subsequently found that the Due Process Clause required
appointed counsel prior to the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a state
mental institution, reasoning that this civil proceeding would have significant
implications for the prisoner's future liberty."
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, involving the termination of
parental rights, the majority began from the presumption that "an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be
deprived of his physical liberty."" Employing the balancing test of Mathews v.
Eldridge, the Court cited several factors that could encourage appointments in
individual cases: the "commanding" nature of the parental interests at stake,
issues of fairness and procedural equality, and the importance of accurate
judicial decisions."
The Lassiter court then weighed these factors and speculated that many,
though perhaps not all, parental termination cases could not overcome the
initial presumption. The Court therefore declined to mandate appointed
counsel in all termination cases as a constitutional matter, instead leaving it to
individual courts or state legislatures to go beyond the constitutional floor."o
The Court articulated several factors that trial courts could consider in
determining whether a particular termination case warranted counsel, such as
whether (1) counsel would make a "determinative difference," (2) expert
testimony was used in the case, and (3) there were "troublesome points of
law."1
In Turner v. Rogers, the Court considered the right to counsel in a civil
contempt case involving possible loss of physical liberty, again without
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
27. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
28. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
29. Id. at 27-30.
30. Id. at 33-34.
31. Id. at 32-33.
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reference to values of civic participation that might be implicated." Despite the
importance of the liberty interest, the majority concluded that court-appointed
counsel was not constitutionally required, provided that alternative procedural
safeguards were in place and that the opposing party was not represented by
counsel either.33 The Court highlighted the possibility that it might examine
equality concerns in the future and expressly left open the question of whether
appointed counsel would be required in a proceeding initiated by the State.'
Likewise, the Court also left open the question of whether an "unusually
complex case" might require appointment of a trained advocate.s
2. Equality Analyses
One factor in the Supreme Court's failure to fully examine the participation
and equality values afoot in civil counsel cases may be the cabining of these
claims under the Due Process Clause, where the analytical role of equality is
less clear. Yet the Lassiter majority's recognition of the power imbalance
suggests an underlying concern about full participation.6 Further, as Gideon
itself noted, procedural equality is an element of fairness -the hallmark of due
process.17
Similarly, the Turner Court's references to equality considerations reflect
the Court's intuitive understanding that inequality in access to the courts
might distort the checks and balances underlying our democratic system.0
Again, portions of the Court's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright point the way,
noting the role that procedural equality plays in ensuring the integrity of our
judicial system. As Justice Black observed in Gideon, "[flrom the very
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
3z. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
33. Id. at 2520.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 6o.
37. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
38. In contrast, some criminal cases have explicitly identified equality concerns. See, e.g., Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1986) ("[J]ustice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of
his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.").
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trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law.""
The formal role of equality doctrine in the broader context of access to
justice was directly addressed in M.L.B. v. S.L.J, concerning the right to receive
the transcript necessary to appeal a termination of parental rights. 4o Analyzing
the issue as a convergence of equal protection and due process, the Court noted
the fundamental nature of the parental right at issue as well as the ways in
which indigency may complicate individual efforts to defend that right.
Holding the state to a standard higher than mere rationality, the majority
rejected the argument that the costs of providing transcripts would be too great
a burden.4 ' Instead, the opinion added the payment of transcript costs in
parental termination appeals to the short list of situations in which states must
affirmatively take poverty into account: (1) the basic right to participate in
political processes such as voting and (2) access to judicial processes that are
criminal or quasi-criminal in nature."
With the M.L.B. ruling, the Court might have redirected courts to examine
access issues through the lens of equal protection and civic participation,
building on the explicit language of Goldberg. However, while the M.L.B.
Court avoided the issue, current equal protection jurisprudence generally
frustrates efforts to address the most troubling equality issues raised by lack of
civil counsel: the disparate impact of such limitations on racial minorities and
women. As Washington v. Davis" (race) and Massachusetts v. Feeney" (sex)
indicate, a litigant must prove invidious intent to sustain such a discrimination
claim under the federal Equal Protection Clause. There is considerable evidence
that the absence of a right to appointed counsel in housing eviction cases has a
disproportionate impact on racial minorities, particularly in certain
communities.4s Similarly, the lack of counsel to obtain or enforce orders of
39. 372 U.S. at 344.
40. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
41. Id. at 104.
42. Id. at 124. Tennessee v. Lane clarifies that judicial services are one of the political processes to
which individuals have a due process right of access. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
43. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
44. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
45. See, e.g., Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. Soc.
88, 104 (2012) (finding that "[w]omen from black neighborhoods made up only 9.6% of
Milwaukee's population but accounted for 30% of evicted tenants").
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protection has a disproportionate impact on women.4' However,
disproportionate impact on identity-based groups alone will not support a
constitutional claim, leaving the question of how lack of counsel affects civic
participation and the status of minorities and women beyond the scope of
equal protection analysis -though, as argued here, central to a due process
analysis.
B. State Courts
All states reject a limitation of the right to appointed counsel to criminal
proceedings alone, but otherwise vary in their approach to the right to civil
counsel question. No state ventures nearly so as far as Justice Black cynically
warned when he penned his dissent in Goldberg. Instead, states generally focus
on instances where liberty is restricted or important family rights are at issue
when granting a right to civil counsel." As with federal law, concerns about
civic participation and procedural equality have sometimes been noted, but
have not yet played a coherent role in state cases.
1. Civil Cases Involving Restrictions on Liberty
Rejecting the federal floor set by Turner, some states have judicially or
legislatively determined that counsel must be provided in cases of civil
contempt where restriction of physical liberty is a possible outcome.*5 In
addition, many states provide a right to counsel in at least a subset of mental
health commitment cases.49 Further, some states have used equal protection or
due process analyses to extend a right to counsel in civil cases challenging
involuntary commitment where legislators failed to provide such rights."o
46. In 1998, women were victims of intimate partner violence at five times the rate of men.
Callie Marie Rennison & Sarah Welchans, Intimate Partner Violence, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
(May 2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf.
47. Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 269 (20o6).
48. See, e.g., State ex rel Graves v. Daugherty, 266 S.E.2d 142, 144 (W. Va. 1980) (noting in an
adversarial paternity proceeding that "[w]e eschew the rubric of 'criminal' versus 'civil' in
determining what process is fair"). See generally John Pollock, Turner v. Rogers: Why
the Supreme Court is a Day Late and a Dollar Short, CONCURRING OPINIONs (June 22,
2011, 6:o6 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.con/archives/2on/o6/turner-v-rogers
-why-the-supreme-court-is-a-day-late-and-a-dollar-short.html.
49. Abel & Rettig, supra note 47, at 264-68.
50. See, e.g., Merryfield v. State, 241 P-3d 573 (Kan. App. 2010) (relying on equal protection); see
also In re Ontiberos, 287 P.3d 855 (Kan. 2012) (finding a due process right to appointed
2270
122:226o 2013
PARTICIPATION, EQUALITY, AND THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
However, a minority of states take advantage of the flexibility confirmed in
Turner to deny appointed counsel in civil matters even when the defendant
stands to lose his or her liberty. For example, the Ohio case of Liming v.
Damoss' relied on both the federal and state constitutions to deny appointed
counsel in a hearing to determine whether the defendant had satisfied the
conditions to purge a civil contempt sanction, which could include
incarceration. The Liming court concluded that the litigant's personal interests
in liberty had been diminished as a result of the prior finding of contempt and
the obligation for continued compliance with the purge conditions, moderating
against a right to appointed counsel.s2
2. Civil Cases Involving Important Family Relationships
Looking beyond cases involving physical liberty, a number of state courts
have expanded the right to counsel to areas involving significant interference
with intimate familial relationships, that is, parental termination, child
custody, and guardianship. In doing so, courts have interpreted due process
principles while appealing to concepts of equality and "fundamental fairness,"
though they have not framed these factors in terms of promoting more robust
civic participation. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in Flores v.
Flores" that an indigent litigant in a child custody proceeding had a due process
right to appointed counsel when her spouse had no-cost representation from
the Alaska Legal Services Corporation, defined as a "public agency." The court
noted that the underlying interest involved-making decisions about one's
child-was one of the most important of civil liberties. Further, concepts of
fundamental fairness played an important role. As the court observed,
counsel for an involuntarily committed sexual predator, following the Supreme Court's
ruling in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
51. 979 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 2012).
52. Id. at 3o6; see also Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985) (requiring the
appointment of counsel only because a civil contempt proceeding transformed into a
criminal contempt proceeding); Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983)
(finding counsel unnecessary because "if the parent has the ability to pay, there is no
indigency, and if the parent is indigent, there is no threat of imprisonment," which satisfied
the concept of "fundamental fairness"); State ex rel Dep't of Human Servs. v. Rael, 642 P.2d
o99 (N.M. 1982) (holding that there is no general constitutional right to counsel in civil
contempt proceedings).
53. 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979).
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"[f]airness alone dictates that the petitioner should be entitled to a similar
advantage" as her spouse."
A concern for fairness and procedural equality also animated an Alaska trial
court in Gordanier v. Jonsson.ss There, the court ruled that the state
constitution's due process and equal protection clauses required appointment
of counsel for an indigent parent in an adversarial child custody proceeding
where the opposing party was represented by private counsel.
Not all states have approached the issue so expansively. Ruling in 1975 in In
re Smiley, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a claim for appointed
counsel in matrimonial cases.ss The court expressed concern that mandatory
appointment in such cases would signal that counsel is a necessary prerequisite
for all access to the justice system, giving rise to dramatically expanded state
obligations to provide counsel.17 Nevertheless, New York courts subsequently
invoked equality concerns under the state and federal due process clauses to
extend appointed counsel in paternity or support cases where one party is
represented by the state."
3. Civil Cases Involving Important Economic and Social Needs
In contrast to the consideration given the right to counsel in family-related
cases, no state's high court has found such a right in situations involving "basic
54. Id. at 895. The Alaska Supreme Court has extended this ruling to circumstances where the
Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault (ANDVSA) is counsel to one of
the parties, determining that ANDVSA is a "public agency." In re Alaska Network on
Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, 264 P-3d 835 (Alaska 2011).
ss. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Gordanier v.
Jonsson, No. 3AN-o6-8887 C1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2007), http://www
.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/Gordanier%20v%2oJonsson%2o-%2oOrder%2oAppointing
%20Counsel.pdf, appeal dismissed, Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Alaska Court Sys., No. S-
12999 (Alaska 2009); see Paul Marvy & Laura Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to
Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131, 134-35 (2009) (explaining the case's
complicated history).
s6. 330 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1975); see also In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Iowa 2004) (holding
that the state equal protection clause was violated when statutes provided counsel for some
indigent parents facing involuntary termination proceedings but not others).
57. In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d at 57-58.
58. See, e.g., Madeline G. v. David R., 407 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Rensselaer Cnty. 1978).
In states where courts have not established a right to counsel in cases involving family
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subsistence" such as shelter, food, or health. 9 While the fundamental right to
family relationships is often deemed to be sufficiently weighty to support a
right to appointed counsel, basic physical or financial needs have not been
viewed as similarly fundamental.o For example, in the Alaska case of
Bustamante v. Alaska Workers Compensation Board, the court refused to appoint
counsel to pursue a workers' compensation claim because the plaintiffs interest
in financial support was not deemed sufficiently significant, and because the
workers' compensation system is intended to be accessible to nonlawyers."
Likewise, the Ohio courts have refused to find a right to appointed counsel in
foreclosure cases."
Writing in 1972, just two years after Goldberg, the Vermont Supreme Court
clarified that it found the democratic distortions arising from lack of counsel to
be less troubling than the countermajoritarian issues raised by judicial
intervention:
To enshrine a doctrine as a constitutional principle is, as a practical
matter, to extract it from the ordinary democratic process of debate and
decision .... It is very likely, for this reason, that there has not yet been
handed down a United States Supreme Court decision requiring that
there be subsidized legal counsel available in civil cases.6 ,
As the Vermont court contemplated, concerns about civic participation and
procedural equality have sometimes led other state actors to expand counsel
s9. David Udell & Laura Abel, Information for Civil Justice Systems About Civil Right to Counsel
Initiatives, NAT'L COALITION FORA CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4-5 (June 9, 2009), http://www
.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/NCCRC%2olnformational%2oMemo.pdf; see Peter B. Edelman,
The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(1987); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1277
(1993); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
6o. Abel & Rettig, supra note 47. Beyond basic economic needs, lack of safety may undermine
individuals' civic participation. Here, the refusal to appoint counsel has not been so
absolute. For example, Ohio courts have extended a right to counsel for juvenile
respondents in cases where juveniles seek an order of protection against another juvenile.
See In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio App. 2010).
61. Bustamante v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 59 P- 3d 270 (Alaska 2002); see also Lay v.
McElven, 96 CA 1325 (La. App. i Cir. 3/27/97); 691 So.2d 311 (denying appointed counsel in
case seeking to vindicate alleged civil rights violations).
62. Williams v. Mone, No. 70649, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating
that there is no right to appointed counsel in a foreclosure case where physical liberty is not
at stake).
63. Caron v. Betit, 30o A.2d 618, 619 (Vt. 1972) (denying attorney's fees for counsel privately
retained to challenge a denial of welfare benefits).
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rights. For example, when the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals
pledged in zon that all homeowners facing foreclosure would be entitled to
legal assistance, he identified fairness and equality as key concerns. According
to the Chief Judge, "[i]t's such an uneven playing field," in which banks
invariably have representation and a litigant cannot get a fair day in court
"without a lawyer."6 ,
However, these developments are on the margins. The basic truth is that
states have expanded rights to counsel principally to protect family
relationships with only occasional mention of the impact that lack of counsel
has on the ability of indigents and other groups to participate equally in
decisions directly affecting themselves and their communities.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHT TO CIVIL COUNSEL
In contrast to federal and state law, international law has often situated the
right to counsel in the context of larger access-to-justice issues. Civic
participation has been a touchstone shaping expert opinions concerning access
to procedural protections. Equality has also had a central place in international
analysis, and the racial and gender impacts that may result from disparate
access to counsel have been widely acknowledged. The discussion below begins
with a review of international legal standards, then turns to decisions applying
these principles.
A. International Law: Civic Participation and the Right to Counsel
The basic building blocks of access to justice in the international system are
prominent in international founding documents. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
which guarantees "due process" without specifying the components of that
right, international law enumerates aspects of the guarantee, including the idea
that fair procedures encompass a component of equality. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,
in the determination of his rights and obligations,"6 s language which has been
repeatedly interpreted to include a right to be represented by counsel in
64. David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Housing, N.Y. TUMEs, Feb. 15,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oli/o2/16/business/16housing.html (quoting Chief Judge
Lippman's State of the Judiciary address).
65. G.A. Res. 217 (III) art. io, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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appropriate cases.66 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
ratified by the United States, also provides for both equality and fairness before
the courts and has been construed by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (HRC) to require appointment of counsel in some instances in
order to ensure that "no individual is deprived in procedural terms of his/her
right to claim justice.",6  In particular, the HRC has opined that "[t]he
principle of equality between parties applies . . to civil proceedings, and
demands, inter alia, that each side be given the opportunity to contest all the
arguments and evidence adduced by the other party. ,68
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
("CERD"), ratified by the United States, addresses procedural fairness through
the lens of racial equality.6 ' The CERD Committee explicitly addressed the
right to civil counsel in its General Recommendation No. 29, urging that State
parties "[t]ake the necessary steps to secure equal access to the justice system
for all members of descent-based communities, including by providing legal
aid."o Further, in General Recommendation No. 31, the Committee
recommended that "legal aid, including the assistance of counsel" be given to
enable victims of racism to more readily bring actions in court.71
These general statements of international law gain meaning as they are
applied to individual countries and circumstances. One aspect of this
application occurs when countries submit compliance reports to the relevant
treaty-monitoring bodies.
The CERD Committee's most recent review of U.S. compliance
illuminated the meaning of the right to civil counsel set out in the CERD
treaty. The Committee specifically noted "the disproportionate impact that the
lack of a generally recognized right to counsel in civil proceedings has on
66. See Martha F. Davis, In the Interests ofJustice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 25 TouRo L. REv. 147, 162 (2009)
67. Id. (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, io, goth Sess., July 9-
27, 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug 23, 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrc/docs/gcartl4.doc.
68. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 67, 13.
69. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination arts.
5(a), 6, Mar. 7, 1966, S. ExEC. Doc. C, 95-2, 66o U.N.T.S. 195.
70. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep., at 115, 6oth Sess., Mar. 4-22,
2002, 61st Sess., Aug. 5-23, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/ 5 7/18 (2002).
71. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep., at 103, 66th Sess., Feb. 21-Mar.
11, 2005, 67 th Sess., Aug. 2-19, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/6o/18 (2005).
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indigent persons belonging to racial, ethnic and national minorities." 2 To
remedy the situation, the Committee recommended that the United States
"allocate sufficient resources to ensure legal representation of indigent persons
belonging to racial, ethnic and national minorities in civil proceedings, with
particular regard to those proceedings where basic human needs-such as
housing, health care, or child custody- are at stake.""
United Nations special rapporteurs have also been outspoken concerning
the civil right to counsel and the ways in which its absence can distort civic
participation.74 The Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has repeatedly noted the
importance of counsel in addressing issues such as forced evictions and post-
disaster displacement." This expert has also highlighted the unique issues
facing women, noting that legal aid is "often restricted to criminal matters and
fails to address family law, systematically disadvantaging women."76 The
Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants has observed the negative impact that
lack of counsel has on migrants subject to detention." In his report on the
United States, the Rapporteur concluded: "[t]he right to counsel is a due
process right that is fundamental to ensuring fairness and justice in
proceedings. To ensure compliance with domestic and international law, court-
appointed counsel should be available to detained immigrants."78
Finally, the Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty addressed access-to-justice
issues for people living in poverty in a report that places community and civic
participation at the center of the discussion. According to the Rapporteur,
the inability of the poor to pursue justice remedies through existing
systems increases their vulnerability to poverty and violations of their
rights. In turn, their increased vulnerability and exclusion further
72. Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: U.S.,
22, 72d Sess., Feb. 18-Mar., 2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008).
73. Id.
74. For more information on special rapporteurs, see generally TED PICCONE, CATALYSTS FOR
CHANGE: HOW THE U.N.'s INDEPENDENT EXPERTS PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).
7s. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate
Standard of Living, Right to Adequate Housing, 45, U.N. Doc. A/66/270 (Aug. 5, 2011) (by
Raquel Rolnik).
76. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate
Standard of Living, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2oo5/ 4 8
(Mar. 3, 2005) (by Miloon Kothari).
77. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Report to the U.N. General Assembly,
72(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2o/24 (Apr. 2, 2012).
78. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to the United States of
America, 114, U.N Doc. A/HRC/ 7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008).
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hamper their ability to use justice systems. This vicious circle impairs
the enjoyment of several human rights.79
The Rapporteur identified free legal assistance as a "fundamental prerequisite"
for remedying this situation. 8o
B. Regional Instruments: Civic Participation and the Right to Counsel
Regional human rights bodies have also construed and applied human
rights law relevant to the civil right to counsel. The United States is a
participant in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
through its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). 8' The
IACHR has repeatedly noted the importance of removing obstacles to access to
justice, including by providing access to counsel." Indeed, the IACHR has
concluded that the complexity of certain proceedings involving constitutional
rights necessitates appointed civil counsel in order to ensure adequate
protection of indigent litigants.
Regional human rights instruments in Europe have also been construed to
require appointed civil counsel. In particular, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has explored the bases for the right under the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Decided by the ECHR in 1979, the case of Airey v. Ireland set the standard
for more than forty European countries with membership in the Council of
Europe.* Ms. Airey, an Irish citizen, sought a legal separation from her
husband. When she was denied counsel under Irish law, she appealed to the
ECHR. Ruling in her favor, the court required that Ireland provide Ms. Airey
79. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 1 5, U.N. Doc.
A/67/2 78 (Aug. 9, 2012).
8o. Id. I 6o.
81. Member States, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/member-states/default.asp
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
82. See Inter-Am. Comm'n on H.R., Access to Justice as a Guarantee of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: A Review of the Standards Adopted by the Inter-American System of Human
Rights, OEA/Ser.I/V/II.129, doc. 4 (Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Access to Justice]; Inter-Am.
Comm'n on H.R., Guidelines for Preparation of Progress Indicators in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 25-33, OEA/Ser.1/V/II.132, doc. 14 (July 19, 20o8).
83. Access tojustice, supra note 82, 7.
84. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law
and the Social Contract: When Will the United States Finally Guarantee Its People the Equality
Before the Law the Social Contract Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 164-66 (2010).
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with counsel and create a legal aid scheme that would address civil
representation needs.s
The court construed Article 6 of the European Convention, which
guarantees a civil litigant a "fair hearing" before an independent tribunal."
According to the Court, "[t]he Convention is intended to guarantee not rights
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.",8
Acknowledging concerns about inequitable access to civic institutions, the
Court observed that the right to a fair trial holds "a prominent place . . . in a
democratic society."" Without counsel, not only might Ms. Airey have been
disadvantaged vis-i-vis her husband - an "equality of arms" concern - but she
also would have had difficulty conducting the complex proceeding.89
The ECHR reaffirmed its position on the civil right to counsel in Steel &
Morris v. United Kingdom,90 a case that extended the right to counsel to a
corporate defamation claim. Litigated in the United Kingdom for ten years, the
dispute resulted in the longest trial ever held in that country. 9' On one side
were two indigent protesters, both activists with Greenpeace. 92 On the other
side was the McDonald's corporation, one of the largest businesses in the
world. When the activists created and distributed a pamphlet alleging that
McDonald's food was unhealthy and its labor practices exploitative,
McDonald's sued them. The activists could not obtain appointed counsel
under the United Kingdom's legal aid scheme.9' Without dedicated counsel,
the length and complexity of the trial made it impossible to maintain
continuity in their representation. 94
In its decision, the ECHR reiterated that the European Convention is
intended to provide practical rights, and that access to the courts is a central
tenet of a democratic society.s Reviewing the particular facts, the court
85. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-14.
86. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
87. Airey, 32. Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12.
88. Id.
89. Id.
go. Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (pt. 3) at 403. (2005).
91. McLibel: Longest Case in English History, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/4266741.stm.
92. Id.
93. Steel & Morris, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (pt. 3) at 414-
94. Id. at 425.
9s. Id. at 427.
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concluded that denial of appointed counsel violated the human rights of the
litigants.96
The ECHR applied the Airey principle once again in Alkan v. Turkey, in
which an indigent seeking compensation for alleged wrongs that he
experienced during military service was denied counsel. In ruling that the
European Convention required appointed counsel, the court cited both "the
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial" and the
importance of the principle of "equality of arms."9 7
Ill. LESSONS: FRAMING A RIGHT TO CIVIL COUNSEL
When he penned his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Black assumed that
dire human need would lead to an interpretation of the Due Process Clause
requiring appointed counsel in a wide range of civil cases. In fact, few, if any,
courts have found these grounds persuasive. Instead, to the extent that the civil
right to counsel has been expanded, concerns about family relationships and
procedural fairness have provided the steady, if sometimes faint, drumbeat.
Justice Black's prediction might have nevertheless become a majority
holding, were it not for the balancing test of Mathews, which weighs the cost to
the state of additional procedures against the procedures' effectiveness and the
impact on the individual. In practice, this approach tends to reinforce
hierarchies of economic privilege and the status quo of access to justice, as what
process is due rests on the value of that process to society.9' While procedural
rights always force some redistribution, that function is significantly limited by
countervailing considerations, such as the cost to the state and limitations on
procedural impacts, weighed under Mathews."
g6. Id. at 428, 43o.
97. Alkan v. Turkey, App. No. 17725/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/webservices/content/pdf/ool-lo8973?TID=gorenbhflcv. The United Kingdom recently
made significant changes to its venerable legal aid scheme, eliminating broad areas of civil
legal representation. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Lawyers Demand Pause in
Legal Aid Reforms, GUARDIAN, May 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/20n/may/I8
/lawyers-demand-pause-legal-aid-reforms. The ECHR decisions discussed here suggest
that the United Kingdom may now be in violation of its international obligations.
g8. See Jerry C. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theoty ofValue, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52-
54 (1976) (describing the ways in which the Mathews test may tend to reinforce
inequalities).
g. The Mathews test does examine the "risk of an erroneous deprivation," often entailing an
assessment of the resources available to each side to determine the risk of error. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). However, that formulation entirely ignores the dignitary
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In contrast, the concept of equality of arms invokes a broader notion of the
social compact underlying the Due Process Clause and, coming under a
different analytical strand, potentially avoids the limitations of the Mathews
test.' At the very least, equality of arms means that a litigant will not be
ambushed in court by an opponent with dramatically superior resources.
However, the concept of equality of arms goes further to provide an assurance
that a litigant's claim will be resolved based on justice rather than resources. As
the Court indicated in M.L.B., this analysis is a composite of due process and
equal protection considerations that moderates the application of Mathews."o'
Federal jurisprudence has paid scant attention to equality principles as a
basis for provision of civil counsel, generally identifying equality as a possible
factor but leaving it for future consideration.'0 2 To date, the equality
considerations identified by the Supreme Court are case-specific issues such as
whether a case is complex. State courts employing both due process and equal
protection analyses have also used equality analyses to evaluate whether
particular statutes irrationally exclude one narrow group or another from
access to appointed counsel."0 3
However, the concept of equality of arms need not be so limited, and
adding considerations of equality to the constitutional due process calculus
would allow courts to examine the broader class-based impacts of the denial of
civil counsel. Equality of arms may be implicated, for example, by the
marginalization of low-income communities which are preyed upon by
predatory lenders. If none or very few of the individuals affected have counsel,
and no counsel is appointed at state expense, an entire community may be
devastated. As the CERD Committee suggested in its review of the United
States, many communities of color lack "equality of arms" by virtue of their
disproportionate poverty or inability to access services. Rather than conduct a
case-by-case review, which slows litigation, creates uncertainty and practical
difficulties for trial judges, and deters litigants from coming forward in the first
aspects of procedural equality, while also requiring that the unrepresented litigant prove
that the risk of error is unacceptable.
1oo. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (noting that access-to-justice cases
involving equal protection and due process considerations "cannot be resolved by resort to
easy slogans or pigeon-hole analysis" (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 66o, 666
(1983))).
101. Id.
1o2. Indeed, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court acknowledged that the
individual litigant was confused by the proceeding's complexity, but concluded that this
inequality was not determinative given the lack of a physical liberty threat. 452 U.S. 18, 29-31
(1981).
103. See, e.g., In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 647-51 (Iowa 2004).
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place, U.S. courts could adopt the approach recommended by the CERD
Committee, making appointed counsel available to indigent litigants seeking to
vindicate discrimination claims.'0o Building on the equality-of-arms approach
to address the class-based impacts of inequality, in addition to the case-specific
impacts, would begin to address the concerns of both the majority and the
dissent in Goldberg. Procedural protections would be employed in the service of
strengthening communities and shoring up opportunities for democratic
participation, while at the same time, bare need alone would not compel a
reallocation of state resources.
CONCLUSION
The values of civic participation and procedural equality have a deep
pedigree in domestic due process jurisprudence, yet neither Supreme Court nor
state court decisions addressing the civil right to counsel have given these
values the consideration that they merit. The concept of equality of arms,
developed in international law and now inching its way into U.S. due process
jurisprudence, in the Turner decision as well as others, is therefore particularly
important. Framed within the due process rubric, a broad construction of
equality of arms can take into account issues of civic participation and
procedural equality that frustrate entire communities and identity groups
seeking full and equal access to the courts. Litigators and legislators alike
should take note of this concept, which reinforces the same values of equality
and participation underlying our democratic system that animated the Gideon
decision a half-century ago.
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104. On the difficulties of case-by-case considerations, see John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, It's
Not Triage if the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 40, 42-44 (2012),
http://pennumbra.com/responses/11-2012/PollockGreco.pdf.
